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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellees agree with the statement of jurisdiction set
forth in the Brief of Appellant,
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue
Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing
sanctions upon appellant Brian M. Barnard (Barnard) under Rule
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to make a
reasonable inquiry into the law before filing his verified
complaint against appellees?
Standard of Appellate Review
An appellate court should use an abuse-of-discretion
standard

in

reviewing

all

aspects

of

a

lower

court's

determination of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.r 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990), applying that standard on
review of a district court award of sanctions under the
substantially similar federal Rule 11.

Accord. Taylor v.

Estate of Taylor. 770 P. 2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(If[W]e will affirm the particular [Rule 11] sanction imposed
by the trial court, including the reasonableness of any fee
award, absent an abuse of discretion.11). Judicial discretion
is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or
1

unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion
is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court.
Corp. , 738 P.2d

Ruebke v. Globe Communications

1246, 1254

(Kan. 1987).

Accord. In Re

Marriage of Pilant. 709 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)
("Abuse of discretion does not exist unless it can be held
that no reasonable person would have ruled as the trial court
did on the facts before it.11)
III.

DETERMINATIVE RULE

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of
Utah. The attorney's address also shall be stated.
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state
his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
2

of litigation.
If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it
is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the pleader or movant.
If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the Third
District awarding appellees their attorney's fees against
Barnard as a sanction under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for Barnard's failure to make a reasonable inquiry
into the law before filing his verified complaint against
appellees.
Course of Proceedings
Shortly

after

appellees

filed

a motion

to

dismiss

Barnard's verified complaint and a memorandum supporting that
motion, Barnard voluntarily dismissed his verified complaint
pursuant to Rule 41(a) (l)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Following Barnard's voluntary dismissal, appellees
filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56.
3

Disposition in Court Below
The district court denied appellees' motion based on Utah
Code Ann. section 78-27-56.

The court likewise rejected

appellees' argument under Rule 11 that Barnard had failed to
make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing his
verified complaint or that his complaint was filed for an
improper purpose. The court found, however, that Barnard had
failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law before filing
his verified complaint and granted appellees' motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 on that basis, awarding appellees
their attorney's fees as a sanction against Barnard.
Statement of Facts
1.
and

August 2, 1989, approximately 10:15 a.m. —

appellee Toni M. Sutliff

(Sutliff) had

Barnard

a telephone

conversation concerning a pending disciplinary action against
Barnard which Sutliff, as Associate Bar Counsel, had been
assigned to handle for the Office of Bar Counsel.

Prior

correspondence from Sutliff to Barnard had indicated that the
disciplinary matter would be set for review by a screening
panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State
Bar.

Barnard telephoned Sutliff to request the names of the

4

screening panel members to which his case had been assigned
(Record (hereafter "R."), at pp. 3, 49-52).
2.

August 2, 1989, 3:07 p.m. —

Less than five hours

after the conversation between Sutliff and Barnard, Sutliff
was served with

a copy of Barnard's

complaint (R., at pp. 8, 49-52).

five-page verified

The complaint sought, among

other things, to prohibit appellees from moving forward on the
disciplinary action against Barnard until such time as they
reveal to Barnard the names of the members of the screening
panel to which his matter would be assigned (R., at pp. 2-6).
3. September 8, 1989 — Appellees filed a memorandum in
support of their previously-filed motion to dismiss Barnard's
verified complaint (R., at pp. 10-12, 24-34).
4.

September 11, 1989 —

Barnard filed a voluntary

dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (R., at pp. 59-65).
5. October 13, 1989 —
Court

a

verified

petition

Barnard separately filed in this
seeking

the

issuance

of

an

extraordinary writ. The petition sought, among other things,
to prohibit Bar Counsel and the screening panel from moving
forward on the pending disciplinary matter against Barnard.
In the petition, Barnard stated under oath that the Supreme
Court has "the exclusive jurisdiction to discipline attorneys;
5

therefore, this action could not be filed in District Court"
(R., pp. 241-252).
6.

January 10, 1990 —

Appellees filed a motion for,

among other things, sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Among other things, appellees

argued that Barnard had failed to make a reasonable inquiry
into the law, as required by Rule 11, prior to filing his
verified complaint.

Two full pages of appellees7 memorandum

supporting their motion for Rule 11 sanctions were devoted to
the argument that Barnard had not made a reasonable inquiry
into the law before filing his complaint (R. , at pp. 218-254).
7. January 19, 1990 —

Barnard file>d a 12-page response

to appellees' motion for sanctions and also filed an 8-page
affidavit executed by himself (R., at pp. 260-280).

In that

affidavit, Barnard stated in part as follows:
13. (a) I filed this action in good faith and
based upon the clear and direct refusal of Toni
Marie Sutliff to reveal to me that [sic] names of
the Screening Panel members even after the matter
was assigned to a panel.
(b) I believed upon filing this action
and believe now that I am entitled to know the
names of the members of an assigned Screening Panel
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to seek
recusal and/or if appropriate, commence legal
action against them.
14.
I filed this action to protect my
interests and rights in a disciplinary action
pending before the Utah State Bar. I did not file
6

this action for any improper motive or purpose. At
the time I filed this action, I honestly believed
that this action was proper,
I continue to so
believe.
But for the filing of this action, I
believe that the Office of Bar Counsel and Ms.
Sutliff would not have provided me with the names
of the Screening Panel members.
15. My only possible error in this action was
filing it in this Court [(the district court)]
rather than as an original petition before the Utah
Supreme Court. I sought to enlist the aid of the
broad equitable powers of this court.
Such a
defect (if that it be) is not a violation of Rule
11 or Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56 (1953 as
amended). The relief sought in this action would
clearly be available from the Utah Supreme Court,
and merely filing an action in the wrong court is
not cause for sanctions.
16. By way of an explanation as to filing in
this Court [(the district court)], I present the
following: prior to this suit, I filed two (2)
other actions against the Utah State Bar in this
Court: Case No. 88-0578, Judge Homer Wilkinson and
Case No. 88-0801, Judge Pat Brian. Each of those
actions involved aspects of the practice of law,
the licensing of lawyers in Utah, or functioning of
the Utah State Bar, all issues which appear at
first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Utah Supreme Court. Ut. Const. Art. VIII,
section 4.
In each of those actions, the
defendants
moved
to
dismiss
for
lack
of
jurisdiction and in each case those motions were
not granted.1
(R., at pp. 263-264) (emphasis in original).

In neither his

response nor his affidavit did Barnard make any further

Barnard's statement in paragraph 16 is inaccurate. In the
two referenced cases, defendants did not make any motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction and there was no ruling on the issue of
jurisdiction.
7

explanation of his pre-filing inquiry into the law of whether
the district court had jurisdiction of his action (R., at pp.
260-280).
8.

February 12, 1990 —

The Third Judicial District

Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, issued a
memorandum decision ruling that sanctions under Rule 11 were
appropriate against Barnard and that appellees were entitled
to their attorney's fees since Barnard had failed to conduct
a reasonable inquiry into the law prior to filing his verified
complaint, as required under Rule 11.

While resolving the

issue of appellees' entitlement to sanctions against Barnard,
the court left open the issue of the cLmount of attorney's
fees, requested appellees' counsel to submit an affidavit
setting forth the amount of fees, and allowed Barnard an
opportunity to object to the amount. (R., at pp. 288-295)
9.
decision

When

the district

determining

court

issued

its memorandum

appellees' entitlement

to

sanctions

against Barnard for his failure to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the law, the only materials Barnard had submitted
to oppose appellees' motion were the response and affidavit
referred to in paragraph 7 above (R., at pp. 253-295).2
2

0n February 26, 1990—after the district court ruled that
appellees were entitled to sanctions against Barnard—Barnard for
the first time set forth in a second affidavit the pre-filing legal
8

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court had reasonable grounds to rule that
Barnard had failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
law of the district court's jurisdiction prior to filing his
verified complaint. The court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing sanctions against Barnard under Rule 11 for failing
to conduct such an inquiry.
VI.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST BARNARD
UNDER RULE 11
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the signature of an attorney "constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
research he claims to have conducted concerning the jurisdiction of
the district court to hear cases relating to disciplinary matters.
He also filed an objection to the award of attorney's fees,
essentially requesting the court to reconsider its decision and to
award appellees no fees. He also filed affidavits from eight other
Utah lawyers. Pursuant to appellees' motion, the district court
struck as immaterial all eight attorney affidavits and most of
Barnard's objection and second affidavit, except those parts
dealing with the appropriate amount of attorney's fees. (R., at pp.
309-363, 376-386, 469-472) Accordingly, those materials took no
part in the district court's determination of appellees' motion for
sanctions and should likewise be disregarded by this Court.
9

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law...." The
rule provides that if a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the couart "shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction" which may include an order to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee.

In this case, the district court

ruled that Barnard failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the law prior to filing his verified complaint.

That ruling

should be affirmed unless the court abused its discretion.
As

indicated

above,

the

standard

of

review,

when

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is appealed, is whether the
district court abused its discretion.

Moreover, abuse of

discretion does not exist unless it can be held that no
reasonable person would have ruled as the trial court did on
the facts before it.
section above.

See, Standard of Appellate Review

Applying that standard to this case leads to

the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing sanctions against Barnard.
The incident which prompted Barnard to file his verified
complaint was the telephone conversation between him and
Sutliff at approximately 10:15 a.m. on August 2, 1989.

Less

than five hours later, Sutliff was served with Barnard's fivepage verified complaint.

In his haste to sue appellees,
10

Barnard failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law.
Had he done so, he would have realized that the district court
does not have jurisdiction over disciplinary matters and that
his effort to challenge the propriety of the disciplinary
procedure should have been initiated in this Court which has
exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.

A little over a

month

action, Barnard

after voluntarily

dismissing

this

acknowledged the accuracy of that very issue when he filed a
verified petition in this Court in which he acknowledged under
oath that the district court does not have jurisdiction over
disciplinary matters but that exclusive jurisdiction over such
matters resides in the Supreme Court.3

In responding to

appellees7 motion for sanctions, Barnard had ample opportunity
to refute the foregoing evidence of lack of reasonable inquiry
into the law.

He did not, however, submit any evidence

detailing his pre-filing inquiry into the law.
filed

a twelve-page

response

3

to

defendants7

Rather he
motion

for

Although the district court did not make a specific ruling on
the issue of whether the district court has jurisdiction over
actions involving disciplinary matters, the court's ruling on the
motion for sanctions implicitly acknowledges the correctness of
that position.
That position is set forth in Defendants7
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed on or about
September 8, 1989. A copy of that memorandum is attached under tab
1. The argument set forth therein regarding the district court's
lack of jurisdiction over actions involving disciplinary matters is
incorporated herein by reference.
11

sanctions and an eight-page affidavit.

The most Barnard

indicated in his response about any pre-filing inquiry into
the law were his conclusary statements that he "made a good
faith inquiry into the law of this action. . .before filing the
complaint herein" (R. at p. 273) and that he "had good reason
to believe that this Court [(the district court)] could, would
and should consider his claims herein for injunctive relief"
(R. at p. 278).
Moreover, in his affidavit, Barnard gave no details about
any pre-filing inquiry into the law but stated as follows:
My only possible error in this action was
filing it in this Court [(the district
court)] rather than as an original
petition before the Utah Supreme Court.
I sought to enlist the aid of the broad,
equitable powers of this court. Such a
defect (if that it be) is not a violation
of Rule 11 or Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56
(1953 as amended). The relief sought in
this action would clearly be available
from the Utah Supreme Court and merely
filing an action in the wrong court is
not cause for sanctions.
R. at pp. 263 and 264.

By way of further explanation as to

his filing this action in the district court, Barnard referred
to two other actions he had filed against the Bar involving

12

"aspects of the practice of law, the licensing of lawyers in
Utah, or functioning of the Utah State Bar, all issues which
appear at first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Utah Supreme Court" (R. at p. 264).
At

no

time

before

the

district

court's

ruling on

appellees' motion for sanctions did Barnard ever provide to
the court any explanation of any pre-filing inquiry into the
law

of

the

district

acknowledgment,

in his

court

jurisdiction.

petition

to

this

His

Court

later

and

his

affidavit filed in the district court, that the district court
lacked jurisdiction belies any reasonable pre-filing inquiry.
Under these circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Barnard had made no
reasonable inquiry into the law prior to filing his verified
complaint. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
sanctions

against

Barnard

and

attorney's fees.

13

awarding

appellees' their

VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellees Toni M. Sutliff and
Utah State Bar respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
district court's order and judgment imposing a sanction upon
Barnard under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
awarding appellees their attorney's fees.
DATED this

v.* day of December, 1990.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P~C.
?

• • r-

/

I

Carman E. Kipp
Robert H. Rees
Attorneys for appellees
Toni Sutliff
and Utah State Bar
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CARMAN E. KIPP - No. A1829
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CITY CCNTHC I . # 3 3 0
175 EAST 4 0 0

Defendants

SOUTH

SALT LAKE C»TY, UTAH 04111*2314
(SOI) 52J-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and UTAH
STATE BAR,

Civil No. 8 9 0 9 0 W 0
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

Defendants
State Bar

Toni M. Sutliff

(Sutliff) and

the Utah

(Bar) submit this memorandum in support of their

motion to dismiss plaintiff's verified complaint.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF«S COMPLAINT MOST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT
In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that he
is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding being handled by
Associate Bar Counsel, Sutliff.

-1-

Plaintiff has alleged that

Sutliff, in

the

course

of handling

the

disciplinary

action,

failed to inform plaintiff of the names of the members of the
screening panel that will review his matter.
The disciplinary proceeding referred to in plaintifffs
verified

complaint is governed, as are all such

disciplinary

proceedings, by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State
Bar promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Rule XVI of those

procedures, the Supreme Court has provided as follows:
All members
of
the
Committee, Board,
hearing
committees,
Bar
Counsel,
disciplinary staff and other persons duly
authorized
to
act
in
disciplinary
proceedings under these rules shall be
absolutely immune from civil suit...for any
conduct in the course of their official
responsibilities.
It is clear that Sutliff was acting in the course of
her

official

responsibilities

as

Associate

Bar

Counsel.

Pursuant to the rule cited above, she is absolutely immune from
civil suit.
maintain

no

Since Sutliff is immune from suit, plaintiff can
action

against

Sutliff

or

the

Bar.

Plaintifffs

complaint should, therefore, be dismissed.

POINT II.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO
GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF
Plaintifffs verified complaint requests this court to

K I P P A N O CHRISTIAN. PC.
ATTOWNCTS AT LAW
CITY CCNTftC Z. # 3 3 0
178 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH
SALT LAKC CITY,
UTAH 84111-231*
(SOI) 5 1 1 3 7 7 3

grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against defendants
with respect to the disciplinary proceeding against plaintiff.
As

discussed

below,

however,

which, if granted, would
area

which

is

plaintiff

require

exclusively

has

requested

relief

this court to delve into an

within

the

province

of

the

Utah

Supreme Court and which would in essence require this court to
enjoin

the

Utah

Supreme

Court.

jurisdiction of matters relating

This

court

does

not

have

to attorney discipline or to

enjoin the Supreme Court and should dismiss plaintifffs verified
complaint.
Prior to July 1985, the power to regulate the practice
of law was inherent in the judicial power conferred on the Utah
Supreme

Court

Constition.

by

Article

In re Disciplinary

P.2d 701, 704 (Ut&h 1986).
when

Article

VIII,

Section

1

of

the

Utah

Action of George McCune, 717

That power was made explicit in 1985

VIII, Section

4 was amended.

That

section, as

amended, provides in relevant part that the Supreme Court "shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law."
practice

Thus, the authority

to discipline

law in Utah resides exclusively

persons admitted

to

in the Utah Supreme

Court.
While attorney

discipline

is exclusively within

its

province, the Utah Supreme Court has delegated to the Bar many
of the functions involved

in attorney

discipline

proceedings.

Indeed, one of the purposes for the "perpetuat[ion], creat[ion],
and continuation]" of the Bar "under the direction and control"
of the Utah Supreme Court is "to provide for the regulation and
discipline of persons engaged
for

Integration

Rule(A)1.

and

In handling

in the practice of law."

Management

of

disciplinary

the

Utah

Rules

State

Bar,

proceedings, the Bar acts

for and as an extension of the Utah Supreme Court.

The ultimate

authority in all disciplinary matters, however, resides with the
Supreme Court.
Since the Supreme

Court

retains exclusive

authority

and jurisdiction in all disciplinary matters, any action by a
lower

court

relating

to

disciplinary

matters

inappropriate as outside that court's jurisdiction.

would

be

Moreover,

any injunction against the Bar relating to a disciplinary matter
where the Bar acts as an arm of the Utah Supreme Court would, in
essence, be an injunction against the Supreme Court.
court does not have jurisdiction

A district

to enjoin the Supreme Court,

the highest court in the state.
These

conclusions

are

supported

from the Appellate Court of Illinois.

by the

recent

case

In Ettinger v. Rolewick,

488 N.E.2d 598 (111. App. 1986), plaintiff was the subject of an

investigation
Disciplinary
concerning

by

the

Commission
possible

Professional
established

Illinois

(Commission)

violations

Responsibility.
by the Illinois

registration and disciplinary
the

Illinois

Bar.

Attorney

of

and
the

Registration
its

Supreme

Court

administrator

Illinois

The Commission

and

is

Code

of

the agency

to supervise the

proceedings affecting members of

Plaintiff,

an Illinois

attorney,

filed a

complaint against the Commission and its administrator seeking
to enjoin them from utilizing in the disciplinary proceeding the
transcript of plaintiff's testimony in a federal court criminal
case.

The Appellate

Court

lower court had jurisdiction
for an injunction.

of Illinois considered whether the
to consider plaintiff's complaint

In concluding that the inherent nature of an

attorney discipline proceeding precludes the circuit court from
asserting jurisdiction in the case, the court stated as follows:
The power to regulate and define the
practice of law in this State is the
prerogative
of
the
Illinois
Supreme
Court....
The Illinois Supreme Court has
never deviated from the rule that it has
original
and
inherent
jurisdiction
to
regulate the practice of law....

[I]t would be presumptuous of any court to
exercise jurisdiction unless specifically
directed to do so by the Illinois Supreme
Court as its agent.
Id. at pp. 601 and 602.
<IPP AND CHRISTIAN. P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CITY CKNTHK X. # 3 3 0
17S CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH
S A L T L A K C CITY.
UTAH 64111-2314

(•Ol) 5 * 1 - 3 7 7 3

Similarly, in this action, plaintiff has requested
this court to intercede in a pending disciplinary proceeding
which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme
Court.

This court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief relating

to a pending disciplinary matter unless pursuant to a clear
directive from the Utah Supreme Court.

There being no such

directive, this court should dismiss plaintiff's complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN
DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
In his verified
defendants1

refusal

complaint, plaintiff

to provide

him with

alleges that

the names of the

screening panel members constitutes a denial of due process
(Verified Complaint K10) and that defendants are engaging in
improper

"forum

shopping"

(Verified

Complaint,

1113).

Plaintiffs1 allegations are nothing short of ludicrous.
The constitutions of both the United States and of
Utah contain similar due process clauses.

Although plaintiff

has not specified whether he seeks relief under the federal or
state constitution, the lack of any reference in the verified
complaint to any federal statutory authority for plaintiffs1
action presumably indicates that plaintiff seeks relief under
<IPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CITY CCNTHC X. # 3 3 0
178 CAST 4 0 0 SOUTH
SALT LAKC CITY,

UTAH 64111-2314
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the Utah constitutional provision.

That provision is found in

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which provides
as follows:
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Plaintiff1s complaint does not allege any deprivation
of life, liberty, or property but merely alleges a deprivation
of due process.
a vacuum.

The concept of due process does not operate in

A claim

that

a personfs

Section 7 have been violated
been

a deprivation

rights under

Article I,

has no meaning unless there has

of life, liberty,

or property.

In this

action, plaintiff has alleged and has suffered no deprivation of
life, liberty, or property.

All that plaintiff has alleged is

that defendants have failed to inform him of the names of the
members of the screening panel assigned to hear his case.
is

not

a

deprivation

of

life,

liberty,

or

That

property, and

plaintiff's complaint must fail on that basis alone.
Even

if plaintifffs complaint

did properly allege a

deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, it would nevertheless be without merit.
case simply

do not support

the claim

The facts of this

that plaintiff has been

deprived of due process of law.
The
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accompanying

affidavits

_ n _
'

of Toni

M. Sutliff and

Christine A. Burdick set forth in some detail the procedure used
generally by the Office of Bar Counsel in processing complaints
against

attorneys

particular

for

alleged

the procedure

against plaintiff.

ethical

followed

violations,

in processing

and in

the complaint

That procedure is pursuant to the authority

granted Bar Counsel by the Utah Supreme Court in the Procedures
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. Those Procedures provide
that

Bar Counsel

preliminary
attempt

is authorized

investigation

to resolve

determined

and directed

of alleged

ethical

to conduct a
violations, to

the complaint, to dismiss those complaints

to be frivolous, unintelligible, or unsupported by

fact or which do not raise the possibility of any unprofessional
conduct, and to refer cases to screening panel for resolution
(See,

Procedures

of Discipline

of the Utah

State

Bar, Rule

of the Utah

State Bar

VIII).
The Procedures
further

provide

of Discipline

for a review

of disciplinary

complaints by

screening panels of the Ethics and Discipline Committee after
the initial investigation

by the Office of Bar Counsel.

If

warranted, the matter may then go before a disciplinary hearing
panel for further consideration.

At every stage, the Procedures

of Discipline provide that the attorney be given adequate notice
and

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN. P.C.
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full opportunity

to be heard

Q

— 0 ~

and to present

his or her

defense.
results

If the hearing before the disciplinary hearing panel
in a recommendation

disbarment,
attorney

suspension,

is first

by the Board of Commissioners of

probation,

or

public

reprimand,

given opportunity to petition

the

the Board to

amend, modify, or reconsider the recommendation and then given
opportunity
Supreme

to

appeal

Court.

Board1s

the

These

determination

procedures

comply

to

amply

the

Utah

with

the

requirements of due process.
Those

due

process

requirements

have

been

stated as

follows:
In depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property, the essentials of due process
are:
(1) the existence of an appropriate
tribunal; (2) inquiry into the merits of
the question presented; (3) notice of the
purpose of the inquiry; (4) opportunity to
appear in person or by counsel; (5) fair
opportunity to be heard; and, (6) judgment
rendered in the record thus made.
State In The Interest Of L.G.W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981).
The accompanying affidavits indicate that at the time
plaintiff requested
the

screening

panel

the names of the screening panel members,
to

which

plaintifffs

assigned had not yet been identified.
not capable of revealing
time.

matter

would

be

Sutliff, therefore, was

that information to plaintiff at that

The affidavits also indicate that that information, when

known, would have been made available and will be made available
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to plaintiff on the same basis that it is made known to any
other attorney requesting it.
Even assuming, however, that the Office of Bar Counsel
refused to disclose
not

constitute

that information to plaintiff, such would

a violation

of due process.

The procedure

followed by the Office of Bar Counsel and the procedure which
will yet be followed pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline
ensure

that plaintiff has been and will be accorded

elements of due process as set forth in L.G.W., above.
simply

no

basis

whatsoever

for

plaintifffs

all the
There is

claim

of a

deprivation of due process.

CONCLUSION
For

the foregoing

reasons, defendants

respectfully

request the court to dismiss plaintifffs complaint.DATED this ff^ day of September, 1989.

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

rkmM E. KIPP
ROBERT H. REES
Attorneys for Defendants
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